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Abstract
Weather index-based crop insurance is increasingly becoming important as a risk
mitigation strategy that farmers may use to mitigate adverse climate shocks and
natural disasters encountered during farming. While Europe, North America, and
Asia account for 20.1%, 55%, and 19.5% of the total agricultural insurance premium
worldwide, respectively, Africa accounts for only 0.5% of the world insurance industry.
One of the key reasons advanced against the low index insurance participation rate in
Africa is the failure to involve farm households at the initial conceptualization and design
of pilot initiatives. Therefore, the main purpose of this paper is to design an improved
participatory methodology that could help elicit information on the value placed by farm
households in Southwestern Burkina Faso on a new weather index-based crop insurance
management initiative. A key concept in the improved participatory methodology is that
of the willingness to pay (WTP) of farm households for the scheme. Knowledge of the
maximum amount that farmers are willing to pay for the scheme can help insurance
policy providers and public policy makers to design and put in place measures that
sustain index insurance schemes in a developing country context and improve welfare
among participating farmers.
Keywords: Climate change, Agricultural risk, Adaptation strategy, Weather index-based
crop insurance, Contingent valuation method, Willingness to pay, Heckman 2-step
estimator
Background
West Africa is generally recognized as one of the regions in the world most vulnerable
to the impacts of climate change (CC) but with the least adaptation and mitigation
capacities (IPPC 2014). The situation is made worse by the fact that agriculture is the
main source of livelihood for more than 60% of the population. However, it is still
mainly rain-fed, practiced on relatively fragile soils, with extensive farming, and with
very little use of modern inputs and improved farming techniques (Kurukulasuriya and
Mendelsohn 2008). By 2030, two thirds of the population in West Africa (i.e., Benin,
Togo, Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, the Gambia, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and
Nigeria) are predicted to grow from 320 to 475 million (about 6% of world’s population)
[WASCAL 2015]. Although most of the growth is predicted for urban areas, the
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estimated 48% living and working in rural areas will face the challenge of food insecurity
for themselves as well as for the ever increasing urban population. According to the
Montpellier Panel (2013), without positive productivity changes, food production systems
in West Africa will only be able to meet 13% of the needs in 2050. Under moderate CC
and without adaptation, total agricultural production in West Africa will even decline by
at least 1.5%. Most of the food demand is satisfied from food imports, which are not
cheap. In addition, the food import bills often worsen the current account deficit due to
persistent negative trade balance which leads to macroeconomic distortions.
It is therefore not surprising that many economists, policy makers, development part-
ners, development finance groups, and research institutions in Africa are now exploring
innovative ways that promote climate smart agricultural (CSA) practices. For example,
the African Development Bank Group (AfDB), in collaboration with Positive Planet,
has taken concrete steps to develop strategies that support institutional and research
capacities that promote microfinance innovation in agriculture. In fact, many West African
nations have started introducing weather-based agricultural crop insurance schemes in
their development visions. These include, for example, Mali and Burkina Faso, which are
currently piloting an index-based crop insurance (IBCI), for cotton and maize; Benin for
maize; and Senegal for groundnut and maize (Muller 2012).
As discussed extensively in the literature on adaptation to risks associated with CC
(e.g., Barnett and Mahul 2007; Mahul and Skees 2007; Barnett et al. 2008; Giné et al.
2008; Yang 2009; Giné and Yang 2009; Clarke and Dercon 2009; Mahul and Stutley
2010; IFAD 2011; MCII 2013; Cole et al. 2013; Karlan et al. 2014; CCAFS 2014; Smith
and Watts 2014), index-based crop insurance represents a very promising agricultural
risk management strategy that farmers may use to mitigate adverse climate hazards and
natural catastrophes encountered during farming activities. In many parts of the world,
various experiences show that implementation of index-based crop insurance policies
have been used to support farmers to limit the losses that natural calamities like
droughts, floods, variabilities in rainfall drought, flood, variability in temperature, dry
spells, hail, and heat waves might cause to crop yields and household income
(Kunreuther 1996; Food and Agricultural Organization 2011; Barnett 2014; Patt et al.
2010). For instance, in Kenya, the mobile technology is being used to support farmers
through crop insurance. Insurance claims are triggered by data from local weather
stations and are distributed in the form of mobile money. Farmers with land as little
as 1 acre can use their assets as collateral for this crop insurance via mobile headsets.
The mobile technology has tremendous potential to chart the future expansion of
such an innovative crop insurance scheme in the rest of the continent where road
accessibility is very limited and weather data precarious, despite the rise of local weather
stations in some countries in the continent.
Some of the merits of index-based crop insurance are: (i) it minimizes the long-
standing contract problems such as moral hazard/hidden action and adverse selection/
hidden information as the index read from weather stations is exogenous and cannot
be tampered with the intervention of participating farmers (Barnett and Mahul 2007;
Barnett et al. 2007; Devereux and Guenther 2009); (ii) in the case of crop damage, it
makes faster payouts, which means that farmers will not have to sell assets or depend
on emergency food aid to survive during climate shocks (CCAFS 2014); (iii) insured
households are more likely to invest on agricultural inputs leading to higher outputs
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and income per unit of land (Sundar and Ramakrishnan 2013); and (iv) it enhances
farmers’ ability to withstand and recover from adversity, therefore strengthening
resilience of communities as well as assisting them to get out of the vicious circle of
poverty and improve household welfare (World Bank 2005; Berg et al. 2009; De Bock
and Gelade 2012; Koloma 2015).
However, despite the merits associated with crop insurance schemes, its coverage and
uptake in West Africa, as in many other developing countries, remain still low (Muller
2012). For example, in Burkina Faso, it has been observed that less than 10% of farmers
have fully enrolled in the ongoing pilot initiatives. Although no consensus has emerged
as to why this is so, some of the possible reasons advanced by many crop insurance
experts include: (i) difficulties in dealing with climate features, particularly the problem
of huge spatiotemporal rainfall variability, which is often used as weather-based index
for designing pilots—also called spatial basic risk (Berg et al. 2009; Ibrahim et al. 2014;
Fonta et al. 2017); (ii) difficulty to solve the trade-offs between level of protection and
cost of insurance premium (Berg et al. 2009; Muller 2012; Koloma 2015); (iii) lack of
stakeholders involvement in analyzing insurance products and policies (van Asseldonk
et al. 2013; Muller 2012); (iv) poor understanding of the concept of crop insurance,
inability to pay premiums, as well as rigid enrolment criteria (van Asseldonk et al.
2013; Planet Guarantee 2014); (v) uncertainty in cash flows as many banks and large
microfinance institutions (MFIs) are very reluctant to finance agriculture through small
microfinance institutions (MFIs) and cooperatives (Koloma 2015; Planet Guarantee
2015); and finally, (vi) poor understanding of famers’ risk perception in general, their
willingness to pay, and the factors that influence their decision to pay such as low level
of trust in insurance providers.
While these limitations may be specific to West Africa, the general literature on
weather index-based insurance highlights other important limitations (see, for
example, Smith and Glauber 2012; Mahul and Stutley 2010; Goodwin 2003; Miranda
1991; Jensen and Barrett 2016). First, widespread participation in agricultural insurance
requires strong public support through the provision of subsidies. As noted in Smith and
Glauber (2012), most crop insurance products would hardly exist in the absence of
subsidies. For example, experiences from USA show that subsidies not only allow for
participation in agricultural insurance, but they also correct the problem of adverse
selection faced by insurance companies (Smith and Glauber 2012). Second, participation
in agricultural insurance is driven by the problems of asymmetric information. Both moral
hazard (i.e., hidden action by farmers) and adverse selection (i.e., hidden information)
affect demand and supply of index-based crop insurance. However, Chambers (1989) and
Fafchamps (2010) show that risk sharing might contribute to reducing the problem of
moral hazard. For instance, when farmers bear part of the cost that is associated with the
loss experienced, they become more cautious about the implications of potential losses
that affect their assets. In such circumstances, farmers are usually more willing to take
actions that may reduce the probability of occurrence of the insured loss.
Third, the problem of basic risk faced by farmers also influences the demand for
insurance services. Farmers might experience losses that are not correlated with the
insured index. Therefore, despite the real advantages that might be gained in participating
in crop insurance, some essential conditions must be met within a country in order for
farmers to truly benefit from insurance services. For example, the presence of good and
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well-functional physical and institutional infrastructures must be present in a country to
allow farmers to make their claims and private insurance companies verify their losses.
These may include good roads, well-functioning regulatory structures, rules of law, and
product delivery mechanisms, among others. Lastly, other minor challenges include
wealth and liquidity constraints and religious and cultural beliefs, among others. As
reported in Janzen et al. (2013) and Dercon and Christiaensen (2011), poor farmers
remain less likely to have the wealth and liquidity that is needed to purchase insurance
policies. Jensen and Barrett (2016) highlight the barriers associated with religious and
cultural beliefs. For instance, in northern Kenya, insurance schemes that did not comply
with Sharia law (Islamic religious law) were not initially well accepted in the region (Jensen
and Barrett 2016). Finally, there is also a risk of increased premium payments and also
insurers withdrawing support in the face of increasing likelihood of crop failure (Tucker
1997; Mills 2007; Duncan and Myers 2000).
These problems, while significant, are not without solutions. For instance, Muller
(2012), Fuchs and Wolff (2011), Kapphan (2011), Clarke and Dercon (2009), Barnett et
al. (2008), and Barnett and Mahul (2007) emphasized the importance of farmers’
involvement in the initial design and conceptualization of insurance schemes as one
way of resolving the challenge of low participation in index insurance by farmers. The
main purpose of this paper is therefore to design an improved participatory methodology
that could help elicit information on the value placed by farmers in Southwestern Burkina
Faso on a new weather index-based crop insurance management initiative. The scheme is
a joint initiative of the Planet Finance Group and the Global Index Insurance Facility
(GIIF) program of the World Bank. This will help inform the design of appropriate house-
hold insurance premiums or levies. A key concept in such an improved participatory
methodology is that of the WTP for the pilot initiative. Knowledge of the maximum
amount that farmers are WTP for the scheme will help Planet Finance Group, donor
agencies, and the Government of Burkina Faso to consider the introduction of subsidies
in order to help sustain the pilot initiative in the area and the country. This will be critical
for compensating farmers for the loss they experience.
Agricultural crop insurance in Burkina Faso and the nature of the new pilot initiative
The importance of agricultural crop insurance as a risk mitigation strategy to climate
change in Burkina Faso was first highlighted in the country’s National Adaptation Plan
of Action (NAPA). However, it was the Joint Ministerial Decision N0 2012MAH/
MRA/MEDD/MEF/MICA/MASSN/MATD of 2012 that formally set the stage for its
operationalization and implementation in the country. However, prior to the decision,
the first pilot initiative in the country (i.e., Satellite-based weather index insurance)
took off in early 2011 by PlaNet Guarantee which mainly targeted maize and cotton
farmers (Planet Guarantee 2014). Similar to many existing crop insurance pilot
schemes in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), yield losses are not directly measured in the
fields of insured farmers. Rather, they are indirectly assessed through the value of an
index (decadal relative evapotranspiration), which is measured through remote sensing
approaches (i.e., EARS method) [Muller 2012].
Farmers receive indemnity/compensation whenever relative evapotranspiration falls below
5% of historical long-running decadal relative evapotranspiration data. The threshold for full
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payment is adjusted depending on areas and crop development period. The payouts are
dependent on three specific periods that mimics the different stages of maize production.
That is, the first stage that covers 30 days after seeding (1st of July), the second stage that
covers 20 days thereafter, and the last stage covering the last 40 days of maize production
(in total 90 days). Thus, the payouts that are proportional to the total covered amount for
the three subsequent stages are 30%, 20%, and 40%, respectively (van Asseldonk et al. 2013).
Insurance premiums are usually tied to credit facilities but, on the average, farmers pay as
much as 10.8% of the value of insured inputs plus an insurance tax of 8% (taking it to 18.
8%). In 2014, there were over 8281 clients enrolled in the country (PlaNet Guarantee 2015).
In order to further expand the experience with new products/crops such as cotton,
sorghum, millet, and groundnut and include new technical partners (delivery channels)
in various target localities, PlaNet Guarantee felt it was critical to understand farmers’
WTP for the new initiative in Southwestern Burkina Faso, as well as factors that drive
the demand for farmers’ uptake. Thus, as part of the effort to support the implementa-
tion of the new pilot initiative in Southwestern Burkina Faso, it was decided to carry
out a contingent valuation method (CVM) study to capture the willingness to pay
(WTP) of farm households in the region. Therefore, this study follows the conceptual
framework underlined in McCarter (2003) and Sarris et al. (2006) to study WTP for crop
insurance in Morocco and Tanzania, respectively. In doing so, we add new insights to the
current literature and describe the extent to which socioeconomic variables, farming prac-
tices, and farmers’ behaviors influence WTP for crop insurance in an African context.
Methods
The analytical framework
We adopt the contingent valuation method (CVM), which is one of the most widely
used participatory methods, for estimating the total economic value (TEV) of many
classes of environmental goods and services that are not easily tradable in markets.
CVM is appealing because its results are relatively easy to interpret. For instance, WTP
estimates can be represented in terms of mean/median values per household or aggregate
values for the relevant population of interest (Fonta et al. 2008).
The theoretical basis of the method is deeply rooted in two well-known monetary
measures of welfare changes in neoclassical welfare economics. That is, the Hicksian
Compensating Variation (CV) and Equivalent Variation (EV) measures of welfare
changes. For illustrative purposes, let us consider the welfare changes to an individual
(consumer) resulting from a proposed new policy plan (e.g., environmental improvement).
Let W 0i denote the pre-policy intervention (or status quo) level of welfare and W
1
i the
ex-post level of welfare. Also, let W 0i ≡ ðy
0
i ; P
0Þ and W 1i ≡ ðy
1
i ; P
1Þ represent the budgets
that measure prices (p) and incomes (y) faced by consumer i under the new policy plan.
Therefore, the transition from status quo level to post-policy intervention level is simply
the difference in the indirect utility given as:
v y1i ; P
1
 
−v y0i ; P
0
 
ð1Þ
Consumer i will accept the change caused by the new policy plan if vðy1i ; P
1Þ−vðy0i ; P
0Þ
> 0. On the other hand, the consumer will reject the plan if vðy1i ; P
1Þ−vðy0i ; P
0Þ < 0. This
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represents the participation constraint. However, since most policy makers are essentially
interested in the actual dollar worth of a proposed new policy intervention, it is often
convenient to adopt a money metric approach to quantifying the resulting change in
welfare (Varian 1992). The simplest approach is to adopt the minimum expenditure
function, which is dual to the indirect utility function as highlighted in Haab and
McConnell (2002). That is, m(q; y, P) which tells us how much money individual i would
need at a vector of prices q to be well off as he or she would be facing prices P having
income y Based on this, Eq. (1) can be written as:
m q; y1i ;P
1
 
−m q; y0i ; P
0
 
ð2Þ
If the change between the status quo and the post-policy intervention levels occurs
only in terms of a price change, say for example q ≡ P0 or q ≡ P1, this leads to the CV
and EV measures of welfare changes, respectively (Mas-Colell et al. 1995). They are,
respectively, defined as:
EV ¼ m P0; y1i ; P
1
 
−m P0; y0i ; P
0
 
¼ m P0; y1i ; P
1
 
−y0i ð3Þ
CV ¼ m P1; y1i ; P
1
 
−m P1; y0i ; P
0
 
¼ y1i −m P
1; P0; y0i
 
ð4Þ
Equation (3) is the Hicksian Equivalent Variation (EV) measure of a welfare change.
When it is greater than zero, the policy plan results in an improvement in welfare, and
vice versa. In other words, if EV > 0, Eq. (3) represents the amount of money an
individual is willing to accept (WTA) from the policy planner in order to forgo the
improvement from W 0i to W
1
i . If EV < 0, Eq. (3) indicates the amount of money an
individual is willing to pay not to switch to the ex-post deteriorating level of welfare
W 1i . Similarly, Eq. (4) represents the Hicksian Compensating Variation (CV) measure
of a welfare change. It tells us how much money would be taken away from consumer
i's income, in her new level of welfare W 1i , in order to make her indifferent between
W 0i and W
1
i . In absolute terms, Eq. (4) represents the consumer’s WTP to be at W
1
i , or
the amount of money a consumer is WTA from the policy planner to remain at the
new deteriorating level of welfare W 1i .
Generally, the choice of which technique to use largely depends on the valuation
problem at hand or the type of policy intervention proposed. If the goal of the new
policy plan is to arrange for a compensation scheme at the new price P1, then the CV
is the most appropriate welfare measure. However, if the goal is to arrange for a benefit
scheme at the new price, then the EV measure is the most appropriate option (Fonta et
al. 2008, 2010a, b). This relationship is shown in Table 1.
Equations (3) and (4) are essential to what a properly framed CVM study seeks to
estimate. It is usually done through the construction of a credible CV scenario. The scenario
Table 1 Relation between EV, CV, WTP, and WTA
EV measure CV measure
Utility increases WTA WTP
Utility decreases WTP WTA
Source: Adopted from Haab and McConnell (2002)
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describes the nature of the proposed new policy intervention plan, the hypothetical level of
welfare W1, the institutional setting in which the proposed policy plan will be provided, and
the manner in which each consumer will have to pay for financing the new plan. The CV
scenario is then presented to a sample of representative consumers through face–face
interviews, recording their WTP or WTA values for the intervention plan. Several value
elicitation formats have been proposed and used in the CVM literature. These include, the
open-ended approach, the bidding game technique, the payment card approach, the single-
or double-bounded referendum (dichotomous) formats, as well as the recently proposed
stochastic payment card design (see, for example, Mitchell and Carson 1989; Freeman 1992;
Fonta et al. 2010a).
The sample selection WTP model
The choice of an appropriate econometric model depends largely on the elicitation format
used in the CVM design. In this study, the dichotomous choice (DC) or referendum
format buttressed with an open-ended (OE) follow-up elicitation question is used. Besides
being highly incentive-compatible, this method provides far more information on WTP
and information on plausibility of responses than the other alternative value elicitation
approaches (Greene et al. 1995). Additionally, DC helps improve the precision of the
WTP estimates since a follow-up question has been introduced after the referendum, as
highlighted in Arrow et al. (1993). This reduces the problem of unfamiliarity with the
market scenario (Mekonnen 2000). In fact, DC is very close to what the respondents are
familiar with as it mimics a typical bargaining process in which the respondents first reject
the offered price and then state their maximum WTP.
To analyze the DC question buttressed with an OE follow-up elicitation question, a
two-step estimation procedure was adopted. In the first stage, a probit model is used to
determine households’ decisions to participate (i.e., the participation/selection model). In
the second stage, an OLS estimation technique is run for the subsample of respondents
with positive WTP values (i.e., the primary equation). This is based on the assumption
that when an individual decides to participate, he or she would provide a positive WTP
value (valuation model). Formally, let Y1 denote the farmers’ maximum WTP amount for
the scheme,Y2 a binary variable taking the value of 1 if an individual decides to participate
in the scheme and 0 otherwise. Let u and v represent the matrices of explanatory variables
corresponding, respectively, to the participation and valuation model as shown in Table 2.
Then, we can write:
lnY 1i ¼ u
0
iαþ αμi ð5Þ
for the (log) of WTP equation, where σ is a scale factor, Y1i is a binary variable observed
only when Y2i = 1 (i.e., if the farmer participates in index insurance), and
Y 2i ¼ 1 if v
0
iβþ εi≥0; andY 2i ¼ 0 if v
0
iβþ εi < 0 ð6Þ
for the participation model, where μi and εi are the error terms that are assumed to be
bivariate normal with zero means, variances equal to 1 and correlation coefficient ρ.
Note that when ρ = 0 the two decisions are independent and the parameters of the two
equations can be estimated separately. However, if ρ ≠ 0, the two decisions are not
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independent and the parameters of the two equations should be estimated jointly
(Strazzera et al. 2003). Additionally, since the unobservables affecting the participation
decision are more likely to be correlated with the unobservables that drive the amount
Table 2 Sample statistics
Variable Definition and measurement Cor.
with IBCIa
Mean/
proportion*
Std. Dev.
Positive WTP (Dep. Var.
in probit analysis)
1 if WTP > 0, and 0 otherwise (1 for a yes
answer to the starting bid offered in the
DC question, and 0 otherwise)
0.88 0.32
Willingness to pay
(Dep. Var. in the OLS
estimation)
Maximum WTP in FCFA monthly
(i.e., households maximum WTP amounts
elicited in the OE follow-up elicitation question)
6364.2 6885.0
Starting_bid The initial bid amount offered to the
respondent in the DC question and
ranged between 2538 CFA ($5.1)
and 17,500 CFA ($47.0)
− 6409.6 6010.7
Age Age of respondent (years, most recent birthday). ± 46.6 14.1
Access_credit Indicating whether or not an individual
has access to formal credit facilities
(1 = access, 0 otherwise)
+ 0.11*
Access_irrigation Indicating whether or not an individual
makes frequent use of supplementary
irrigation technique (1 =make
frequent use, 0 otherwise)
± 0.43*
Confidence Indicating whether or not an individual
has confidence in microfinance institutions
designated as fund manager for the
Scheme (1 = confident, 0 otherwise)
+ 0.77*
Cost_estimate Annual cost of crops damage to
household during the last 12 months
(in CFA per Hectare)
+ 194,832.3 311,592.6
Crop_diversity Indicating whether or not an individual
engages in crop diversity as an
adaptation strategy to climate
risk (1 = engages, and 0 otherwise)
± 0.63*
Education Number of years of schooling + 2.6 3.7
Farm_activities Work on farm activities or not
(1 = work, 0 otherwise)
+ 0.98*
Farming_experience Number of years of farming experience + 31.1 15.1
Farm_size Household farm size (in hectares) + 1.6 1.5
Gender 1 if male, and 0 otherwise ± 0.92*
Household_income Sum of household income from farm and
nonfarm activities (last 12 months in CFA)
+ 163,552.9 159,764.8
Household_size All members living and feeding commonly
from same source
+ 11.6 10.4
Knowledgeable_risk Indicating whether or not an individual has
basic knowledge about climate change
risks to agriculture (1 = aware, 0 otherwise)
+ 0.87*
Knowledgeable_insurance Indicating whether or not an individual is
knowledgeable about crop insurance in
general (1 = knowledgeable, 0 otherwise)
+ 0.32*
Social_capital Whether or not an individual received support
from friends, relatives, or through group
membership to cope with climate risks
in the last 12 months prior to survey
(1 = received, and 0 otherwise).
± 0.39*
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of money that farmers are willing to pay for the scheme, Eqs. (5) and (6) have been
estimated jointly using Heckman’s 2-step estimator as follows (Heckman 1977; Maddala
1983; Köhlin 2001; Greene 1993; Fonta et al. 2010b). Firstly, note that the conditional
expected value of Y1i is given as:
E lnY 1ijY 2i ¼ 1½  ¼ u
0
iαþ ρσλ v
0
iβ
 
: ð7Þ
where λðu0iαÞ ¼ ϕðv
0
iβÞ j Φðv
0
iβÞ is the inverse of the Mills ratio and ϕ and Φ are the
standard normal density and standard normal functions, respectively. The first step of
Heckman’s approach is to estimate the participation equation using a probit model,
which generates an estimate of λ. The second step entails an ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression for only the subsample of farmers with positive WTP responses of Y1i
(i.e., valuation equation) on x and λ^.
Data collection
The study was primarily designed to meet the policy challenge of improving farmers’
resilience to climate change impact through crop insurance implementation. The data
were collected from the southwestern administrative region of Burkina Faso, which is a
pilot location for a proposed new index-based crop insurance management initiative
proposed by PlaNet Guarantee. The region is located between the 700 and 1100 mm
isohyets and subject to severe dry spells within the rainy season (Ibrahim et al. 2014).
The length of the growing period is quite variable, ranging from 70 to 100 days/year.
The overall population density of the region is around 70 inhabitants per square km.
This is quite high when compared with Burkina Faso’s average population density of 50
inhabitants per square km. Agriculture, livestock, and fisheries are the main economic
activities in the region and provide employment to about 75.4% of the total work force.
The study was undertaken in ten villages in Southwestern Burkina Faso (Fig. 1).
Selection of the villages was based on public enlightenment campaigns that focused on
agricultural crop insurance coverage carried out in these villages by PlaNet Guarantee. The
data were collected between May and June 2014, using two complementary approaches:
focus group discussions (FGDs) and quantitative surveys with household-level question-
naires. The FGDs were mainly used to construct the crop insurance management scenario
including other important CC information that could not be obtained through household
questionnaires. The household survey focused mainly on the collection of primary data on
farm household-level variables including the crop insurance management scenario under
which the evaluation took place. It was presented to the respondents in the following form:
We would like to ask you a number of questions related to the potential of
introducing a new index-based crop insurance scheme in Southwestern Burkina Faso
by PlaNet Guarantee. The nature of the proposed scheme is as follows: you pay a
fixed amount of money for the next one year (an insurance premium) to a designated
microfinance institution working with PlaNet Guarantee to cover your crops against
dry spells during sowing and maturity. This amount could be paid weekly, every two
weeks, or monthly depending on your preferred payment frequency and the type of
insurance contract entered into. Only in the case of an officially acknowledged dry
spell occurrence that you will get compensated for any losses incurred on your farms.
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In case the disaster is not officially recognized, you will not be compensated. However, if
there is a dry spell disaster and you claim compensation, an insurance expert will visit
your farm and assess the extent of the crop damage. Based on his or her independent
assessment, you will be compensated accordingly, up to the maximum of your insurance
sum and contract, terms and conditions of which are protected by law.
The respondents were then presented with a DC elicitation question buttressed with an
OE follow-up elicitation questions. First, the respondents were asked whether they are
willing to participate in the new index-based crop insurance pilot initiative. Those who
said ‘yes’ to this initial question were then asked how much they would like to pay for
their most preferred crop insurance product and coverage and how they will like to pay
(i.e., cash or kind). Second, the valuation question was then introduced after this,
asking respondents for a monthly insurance premium ranging between 2538 FCFA
(US$ 5.1) and 17,500 FCFA (US$ 35.0). If the respondent said yes to the initial bid offer,
a follow-up question was then asked, to elicit the respondent’s maximum WTP
amount. However, if the answer was no, another follow-up question was asked, to find
out the reason for the refusal to pay.
Prior to the actual survey, an official debriefing session was held with the Director of
the ‘Direction Provincial de Agriculture’ in the region. The aim was to explain the
purpose of our field visits, solicit for assistance in setting up meetings with farmers,
and identify contact persons in each community to facilitate the FGDs. Ten graduate
students from the University of Ouagadougou were trained on each topic of the household
questionnaire comprising of six sections (household education, consumption, employment,
perception of climate risk or hazards, climate manifestation on farmlands, and risk
management strategies). The enumerators were instructed to interview only the household
heads defined as the breadwinner or the economic head of the family. However, in cases
Fig. 1 Sampled communities in Southwestern Burkina Faso
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where household heads were not available, repeated visits were made or in rare cases the
spouse or next eldest person in the household was interviewed. Overall, a total of 267
farmers were randomly selected in the 10 sampled communities. This formed the
appropriate minimum sample required for the study based on the Taro Yamane specifica-
tion with a 5% margin of error (Yamane 1967).
Results
Sample statistics
Table 2 provides the description of variables used in the analysis. As shown (Table 2),
88% (235 respondents) had positive WTP values for the new crop insurance scheme.
However, in terms of household characteristics, the average household size was about
11. Most of the household heads interviewed (98%) were farmers although about 57%
were also engaged in off-farming activities such as petty-trading and craftsmanship.
The average household per capita income for the sample was calculated as 163,533
FCFA or about US$327.1 per annum or 13,627.75 FCFA (US$ 27.3) per month. Close
to 92% were male-headed households while the average age was about 46 years. In
terms of years of schooling, the average was about 2.6 years. Also, the average number of
years devoted to farming was about 31 years while the average household farm size was
about 1.6 hectares. In terms of social capital, defined as support from group membership
or any form of support received from friends or relatives to cope with climate change-
related risks, about 39% acknowledged having received support in the last 12 months
prior to the survey. Equally, more than 63% of the sample reported making use of crop
diversification as an important climate change adaptation strategy.
Furthermore, about 43% of the households acknowledged making use of supplementary
irrigation techniques. Households with access to any form of credit facilities (formal) were
less than 11%. Further, more than 69% of the respondents were very knowledgeable about
climate change risks of which more than 87% reported having suffered from at least one
episode of climate disaster in the last 12 months. The average cost of an episode of
climate damage per farm hectare per annum was estimated as 194,832.3 FCFA or about
US$ 389.67. Further still, only about 32% of the respondents reported having basic
knowledge about crop insurance in general. In terms of previous participation in any crop
insurance management initiative, less than 5% indicated having participated in the past.
Finally, more than 77% expressed confidence in microfinance institutions as appropriate
fund managers for the scheme.
Determinants of WTP for the scheme
Here we focus our attention to the econometric analysis of the determinants of WTP for
the scheme. First, it is useful to distinguish between responses that can be considered
valid and those that appear ‘invalid’ in the analysis. Out of the 267 completed interviews,
32 respondents (12%) were considered to have invalid responses to the valuation question.
The main reasons for such invalid responses were protest bidders (13) and outliers (19).
Protest respondents were those who said they cannot afford to pay for the scheme due to
cash constraints (3), those who said the scheme was not important to them (5), as well as
those who said they will wait for the government (5). Outliers, on the other hand, were
those whose maximum WTP amounts were more than 5% of their income (8), including
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those who accepted the initial start bid proposed but reported a significantly lower
amount in the OE follow-up elicitation question (11).
Based on this, it was necessary to find out whether excluding invalid responses from
the econometric analysis would lead to a sample selection bias problem, which may
have two likely consequences as highlighted in Mekonnen (2000). First, testing for
theoretical validity using the valuation function in the empirical analysis may generate
inconsistent parameter estimates similar to those stated in Heckman (1977) or Maddala
(1983). Second, the estimated benefit measures and hence the aggregated WTP values
may also be biased. As discussed in Mekonnen (2000), Strazzera et al. (2003), Fonta
and Ayuk (2013), and Fonta et al. (2012), a preliminary test for the presence of sample
selection bias is to test for the differences in the means of household covariates
between the two groups. Any significant difference is a potential indicator of the
presence of sample selection bias. For most of the considered variables shown in
Table 3, there were no significant differences between the two groups of respondents
except for the variable ‘Access to irrigation’ for which the difference is found to be
statistically significant at a 10% level. Furthermore, the t-test of the coefficient of λ in
the regression equations with a value of −0.82 in Table 4 is not significantly different
from 0. These findings reinforce the absence of a sample selection bias problem when
invalid responses are excluded from the econometric analysis.
The econometric results based on Heckman 2-step estimator are presented in Table 4.
However, note that the table reports the parameter estimates for the best-fit specifications
(i.e., most valid reduced form models) from the two equations (i.e., participation and
valuation) selected by means of likelihood ratio (LR) tests.
Starting first with the probit regression estimates (Eq. 6), there are some statistically
significant coefficients in the participation model. These identified variables depict
certain aspects of the sample that influence a household decision to participate in the
index-based crop insurance scheme. Among the identified variables, the amount an
individual is asked to pay (i.e., the starting price), the age group of a respondent, access
to formal credit facilities, households that make frequent use of supplementary
irrigation techniques, the cost associated with managing climate risk at farmlands,
being engaged in crop diversification, being a past victim of climate hazard, having
knowledge about crop insurance in general, as well as household income play a significant
role in the households’ decision to participate in crop insurance.
Table 3 Comparison of means for ‘valid/invalid’ WTP responses
Positive WTP responses Invalid WTP responses
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. t-stat
Age 46.1 0.933 50.2 2.022 −1.53
Access_irrigation 0.42 0.03 0.55 0.091 −1.98*
Education 2.7 0.246 2.5 0.680 0.24
Farm_activities 1.0 0.006 1.0 0.032 1.18
Farming_expirience 31.0 0.988 32.2 2.693 −0.41
Gender 0.92 0.017 0.90 0.054 0.39
Household_income 165,317.0 10,437.1 150,179.8 28,728.6 0.50
Household_size 11.7 0.708 11.2 1.190 0.29
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Taking a look at the results, the effect of the amount the individual is asked to pay
for the scheme (i.e., the starting price) is negative, implying that higher amounts
discourage farmers and seem to induce a lower propensity to participating in the insur-
ance scheme. This may be due to the differential existing between the proposed bid
amount and the individual’s true reservation price for the scheme. This is an important
finding because the amount of premium might be the key impediment to participating
in index-based crop insurance schemes in developing country settings. This has an
important policy implication for governments (e.g., providing subsidy and other
support) that introduces the initiatives to support the agricultural sector. Also, the
age group to which an individual belongs has an effect on the decision to participate.
In particular, individuals that fall within the middle age group (i.e., 36–59 years) are,
on average, 1.4 times more likely to participate in crop insurance than the young
adults (i.e., 22–35 years). The same can be said about the elderly (i.e., 60 and above
years): they are 2.4 times less likely to participate than the young adults. Subsistence
Table 4 Modeling results from Heckman’s 2-step estimation procedure
Probit estimate (first-stage equation) OLS estimates (primary equation)
Participation model Valuation model
Variable Coef. Std. Err. z -value Coef. Std. Err. t -value
Constant 1.101 0.921 1.20 4.656 4.846 0.96
Starting_bid −0.00016 0.00003 −4.74***
Age (young adults)
Middle age −1.372 0.554 −2.47**
Elderly age −2.685 0.877 −3.06***
Access_credit 0.276 0.003 3.18***
Access_irrigation −2.431 0.988 −2.46**
Cost_damage 0.318 0.146 2.17*
Crop_diversity 0.235 0.091 2.57**
Education (no formal)
Primary education 0.981 0.429 2.29**
Secondary education −0.265 0.429 −0.62
Tertiary education −5.438 22.266 −0.24
Farming_expirience 0.027 0.013 2.08*
Farm_size 0.889 0.389 2.28**
Gender −0.727 0.365 −2.17**
Hazard_expirience 1.412 0.396 3.57***
Income (low)
Middle income 0.316 0.127 2.50** 0.087 0.020 4.31***
High income −0.595 0.440 −1.35 −0.322 0.262 −1.23
Knowlwdgeable_insurance 0.911 0.317 2.87***
Knowledgeable_risk 0.582 0.230 2.53**
Rho (ρ) −0.224 0.274 −0.82
Sigma (σ) 6.57 0.35 18.78***
Lambda (λ) −0.147 0.182 −0.81
Log-likelihood −1944.5
Obs. 267 235
Significance of parameters *** <0.01, ** < 0.05, * < 0.10
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agriculture is very strenuous thus, other things remaining constant, with more ageing,
the less likely one will be actively involved in agriculture. This may explain why the
participation rate drops with increasing age. In addition, older farmers might have a
lower level of trust toward modern insurance products compared to middle-aged or
young farmers. The same can be said about having more access to supplementary
irrigation land or technology. The more access an individual has, the lower the
participation rate. This is possibly due to the fact that such households have more
access to water to support crops during dry spells. In fact, McCarthy (2003) also
found a negative correlation between access to irrigated land and the demand for crop
insurance in Morocco.
On the other hand, having more access to formal credit increases the tendency to
participate in crop insurance uptake. Formal finance (e.g., at commercial banks) can
complement informal finance, which is often commonly used to handle agricultural
shocks in the developing world. In fact, this is expected as the ongoing pilot insurance
scheme in Burkina Faso is essentially credit-based by design. Crop diversification also
revealed a similar effect on a farmer’s decision to participate in the pilot scheme. In
particular, the positive coefficient implies that the greater the crop diversity, the higher
the participation rate. This is so because crop diversification reflects a key risk manage-
ment strategy to climate change in the Sahel. The same can be said about farmers that
were past victims of a climate change event. They have a higher propensity to partici-
pate than nonvictim farmers, possibly because of the high associated cost incurred in
managing such an event experienced previously. In fact, McCarthy (2003) found that
the demand for crop insurance is higher where risk management and/or coping mecha-
nisms are relatively more costly. Also, knowledge about crop insurance schemes equally
had a positive effect on a household’s decision to participate. As explained by Skees et al.
(2001), the decision to use insurance is highly dependent on farmers’ understanding of
the insurance product. It is therefore not surprising that farmers who are better informed
about crop insurance are more willing to participate in the new pilot initiative. Finally,
income has a positive effect in crop insurance participation rate; the higher the income,
the higher the probability of participation. Clearly, richer households have a stronger
ability to pay (ATP) for insurance contracts especially at the beginning of the planting
season, when cash flows are generally tightest. As reported in Table 4, the highest income
earners were, on average, 0.59 times more willing to participate than the lowest income
earners. This does not mean that policies should focus on those who have a higher
willingness to pay. Rather, this gives an indication that poor farmers should be targeted in
using affordable premium crop insurance initiatives. This allows poor farmers with access
to the best possible cover for potential risks.
In the censored regression where WTP > 0 is the dependent variable, again the coeffi-
cient on household income was significant and positive. This implies that wealthier house-
holds are willing to pay more for the scheme than their poorer counterparts (presumably
for the same reason that they are also more willing to participate in the scheme). The
results further reveal that more educated farm household heads reported lower WTP
amounts than their less educated counterparts. For instance, those with tertiary education
are, on average, 5.4 times less willing to pay for the scheme than farm household heads
with no formal education. One plausible explanation for this is that farmers who are
better educated are likely to have better access to formal credit facilities and to irrigated
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crop lands. This may explain why educated household heads have lower demand for
crop insurance than the less educated ones. Furthermore, the results suggest that
farm households with larger farm size holding are willing to pay more for the scheme
than households with small farm sizes. The obvious reason for this is wealth. There is
more at stake for wealthier farmers than poor farmers if dry spells and other natural
disasters are encountered. It is evident that farmers with large farms have more crops
to insure than those with smaller plots.
Higher WTP amounts were associated with male-headed farm households relative to
female-headed households. This may be linked to the household decision-making
process in the context of Burkina Faso. Males are usually responsible for all major
household decisions, including making insurance payments. Finally, households who
are better informed about the risk of climate change to agriculture expressed higher
demand for the scheme than the less knowledgeable households. This may be due to
the fact that such households are aware of the higher relative costs associated with
managing climate change risk as well as to cope with the consequences.
WTP predictions
Based on the fact that there is no significant evidence of sample selection bias, the
modeling results for the subsample of valid responses (OLS results) were used to predict
the mean WTP value for the crop insurance pilot initiative in Southwestern Burkina Faso.
The predicted results are shown in Table 5. Mean WTP for the sampled households is
estimated as 7142 FCFA or US$14.3 monthly with interval estimates of 6239 FCFA
(US$12.5) and 8045 FCFA (US$16.1), respectively. This estimate seems intuitively
reasonable when compared with the credit-based crop insurance scheme in Zambia where
farmers pay an equivalent membership fee of US$10 (van Asseldonk et al. 2013). However,
our estimate is slightly lower when compared to what is currently being charged in
Senegal. The cost of the premium of an insurance system in Senegal varies from 14,000
FCFA (US$23.3) to 20,000 FCFA (US$33.3), respectively. This is of course attributed to
different product coverage and the insurance contracts used.
It is important to emphasize the fact that the ongoing crop insurance pilot in Burkina
Faso has no standardized procedure for designing and charging insurance premiums to
reflect fairness and equity in the pricing decision. It has been greatly criticized for
inducing unfair differences in protection level between areas as well as failing to
account for sensitive phases of the crops (Muller 2012). The predicted WTP estimate
obtained in our study offers an important starting point for the pricing decision of the
scheme.
Despite the interesting results discussed above, it is important to highlight a number
of limitations that are associated with the current application. The study uses a WTP
approach. Although the WTP approach proved quite useful and highly relevant under
the socioeconomic and farming practice conditions in Burkina Faso, it is important to
Table 5 Summary statistics of monthly mean WTP bida
Model Obs. Mean CI-mean (95%)b
OLS 235 7141.69 (14.3) 6238.68 (12.5) – 8044.71 (16.1)
aAll figures presented as West African CFA ($US)
bNormal-based 95% confidence interval generated with Bootstrap replications
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acknowledge the fact that other alternative methods of analysis exist in the literature.
These alternatives might have yielded slightly different modeling results. For instance,
to evaluate the extent to which farmers value index-based crop insurance, alternative
approaches have used role-playing games (Patt et al. 2006; Patt et al. 2010; Peterson
and Mullally 2009). Simulation games provide farmers with first-hand experience over
the potential implications of having an insurance scheme. Simulation games enhance
communication and opportunity for experimental learning between farmers and poten-
tial insurance companies. Beyond game-related simulations, additional methods involve
experimental and quasiexperimental studies that estimate the factors that drive partici-
pations in index-based insurance schemes (Takahashi et al. 2016; Serfilippi et al. 2015).
Another limitation relates to our exclusive focus on index-based insurance, despite
the existence of a variety of insurance schemes available to farmers, to mitigate either
input or production-related risks. Different risk management options are available to
farmers in the developing world and insurance is only one of these risk management
options. Moreover, agriculture insurance can even take different forms such as yield
and revenue insurance, commodity price insurance, weather insurance, etc. Nevertheless,
beyond insurance schemes, farmers have various alternative ways that can be used to
manage risks. These include crop diversification and spatial diversification that involve
farming in alternative lands with different soil characteristics, self-insurance, and the use
of pesticides, herbicides, and other modern input-based means of controlling production
risks. Finally, it is important to highlight on the critical importance of peers or family
members to mitigate risks in an African context. When farmers can rely on their relatives
to mitigate their risks, evidence show that this tends to reduce vulnerability within the
community (Udry 1994; Fafchamps and Gubert 2007; Fafchamps and Lund 2003). Hence,
in developing countries such as Burkina Faso, one might expect limited propensity and
low participation in formal index-based insurance schemes.
Conclusion
Weather index-based crop insurance represents a very promising agricultural risk
management strategy that farmers may use to mitigate adverse climate hazards and
natural catastrophes encountered during farming activities. In many parts of the
world, implementation of such crop insurance policies have allowed for consistent
support to farmers to limit the losses that natural calamities like droughts, flood,
variabilities in rainfall and/or temperature, dry spells, hail, and heat waves might
cause to crop yields and income. It has several advantages in that it minimizes both
moral hazard and adverse selection and it makes faster payouts during natural disasters,
which means that farmers will not have to sell assets or depend on emergency food aid to
survive. In addition, crop insurance encourages more investment in agricultural inputs
leading to higher outputs and income per unit of land, and it enhances farmers’ resilience
to bouts of recurrent food insecurity. Overall, it is vital to get households out of poverty.
Unfortunately, index-based crop insurance has not made significant uptake and progress
in Africa. While Europe, North America, and Asia account for 20.1%, 55%, and 19.5%,
respectively, of the total agricultural insurance premium worldwide, Africa accounts for
only 0.5% of the world insurance industry (World Bank 2009). Of the few existing pilots,
especially those in West Africa, the coverage and uptake are still very low. Although no
consensus has emerged as to why this is so, one of the foremost reasons given is the lack
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of stakeholders engagement and involvement in the initial conceptualization and design of
the proposed schemes.
The main purpose of this study was, therefore, to shed more light on the role of
stakeholders’ involvement (participation) in designing successful weather index-based
crop insurance pilots in rural West Africa. We used as a case study the southwestern
region, Burkina Faso, where a new crop insurance management initiative is being
proposed by PlaNet Guarantee. In the application context, we find that integrating
stakeholders’ opinion at the initial onset of the scheme can go a long way to increase
participation and hence uptake. The results further suggest that analysis of the bid
function can provide very useful qualitative and quantitative information, which is
difficult to identify using alternative economic evaluation techniques. For instance, the
empirical findings indicate that the amount charged as insurance premium and the
frequency of payments significantly affect weather index-based crop insurance coverage
and uptake. Higher amounts seem to discourage participation and take-up. Similarly,
the more informed consumers are about crop insurance, the greater their chances of
participating and the higher their demand. Interestingly, the results also reveal that
households with more access to formal credit facilities showed higher participation and
greater take-up rates. More interestingly and unsurprisingly, the results show that
income is perhaps the most significant determinant for the demand of index-based
crop insurance in general.
In light of the above findings, five important policy recommendations can be proposed.
Firstly, in terms of participation and coverage, it may be necessary to split the insurance
premium into very little amounts that can be more frequently and manageably paid by
farm households. Secondly, increasing awareness of this type of crop insurance through
public education and enlightenment campaigns will go a long way to increasing coverage
and uptake. Thirdly, encouraging programs that are tailored toward improving farm
households’ access to credit facilities would play a vital role in increasing crop insurance
participation and coverage in the region. This can be done by complementing informal
and semiformal financial sources. Fourthly, investing in irrigation (an untapped potential
in much of Africa) will, in the long run, support local farmers to cope with climate change
uncertainty. Finally, policy should target poor famers so that they will have the necessary
financial funds in place (e.g., conditional cash transfer and income support) so that they
benefit from crop insurance schemes that can buffer them from shocks that lead to crop
failure.
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